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This paper reviews the stylized facts regarding the levels of human capital investments and the returns 
to those investments in developing countries.  These returns are substantial and are pervasive across 
demographic groups.  Returns are comparable between men and women and between urban and rural 
residents.  The study shows that 23% of children in developing countries do not complete the fifth 
grade and of these, 55% started school but dropped out.  We argue that eliminating dropouts is the 
most cost effective way to make progress on the goal of Universal Primary Education.   Of the various 
mechanisms we can use, mechanisms that stimulate schooling demand have the strongest evidence of 
success to date and are the most cost effective.   
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
a Department of Economics,  Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070, pfo@iastate.edu 
a Department of Applied Economics,  University of Minnesota  
a The World Bank  
Opinions expressed are our own and not necessarily those of the World Bank. Amy Damon, Jean 
Fares, Deon Filmer, Sarojini Hirshberg, Manny Jimenez, Elizabeth King, Claudio Montenegro, 
Annette Richter, Ray Robertson, and T. Paul Schultz provided advice on topics, content and relevant 
literature as we prepared background materials for this paper. Shiva Sikdar provided able research 
assistance.    2
The Benefits and Costs of Alternative Strategies to Improve Educational Outcomes 
 
I. Benefits from schooling 
  Few empirical relationships have been investigated more frequently than that between years of 
schooling and earnings.  Literally hundreds of studies using a wide variety of data sets from developed 
countries, spanning many decades, and employing alternative specifications to correct for various 
potential sources of bias, have consistently found positive private returns per year of schooling.
1  
Returns are frequently equal to or above long-run average market returns to other investments. 
  Estimated returns to schooling in developing countries have been comparable in magnitude to 
returns found in developed countries.  Table 1 presents ordinary least squares estimates of returns from 
a standard Mincerian earnings function applied to 63 household data sets from 42 developing 
countries.  The results are presented separately for males and females and for urban and rural residents. 
These data sets were selected because the variable definitions could be harmonized across countries 
and because separate returns could be estimated for men and women and for urban and rural residents.
2  
The same model was estimated for all countries so that the variation is not due to specification choice.  
Several interesting results are apparent.   
  First, private returns, estimated as the percentage increase in annual earnings obtained from an 
additional year of schooling, are almost universally positive.  In only one case for women, four cases 
for men, three for urban residents and two for rural residents did education fail to raise earnings.  The 
interquartile range for estimated real returns across countries varies from 5 to 10 percent for men and 
from 9 to 12 percent for women.  The interquartile range for both urban and rural residents lies 
between 5-11%.  The median return ranges from 8-10% per year of schooling, depending upon the 
                                                 
1 Card(1999) contains an excellent review of the various estimation methods and biases associated with analysis of the 
returns to schooling.  It appears that returns to schooling generated by ordinary least squares estimation tend to understate 
true returns, although the bias appears to be small.  
2 We are indebted to Claudio Montenegro for sharing these regressions results.   3
demographic group.  This is quite consistent with the average return of 10.9% for low-income 
countries found in the Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) literature survey of studies published in the 
1990s.  While there is considerable variation in the magnitude of the return, there does appear to be a 
positive reward to individual time spent in school.  
  A second generalization is that in all but a handful of countries, estimated returns to schooling 
are higher for women than for men.  Estimated returns average 7.2% for men and 9.8% for women 
across the data sets.  One might suspect that the difference in returns is due to a selection problem—a 
lower proportion of women than men are engaged in wage work, and so one might suspect that it is the 
most productive women that are disproportionately drawn into the labor market.  However, the 
direction of bias is not obvious—women who opt not to enter the labor market will have a value of 
time in nonmarket activities that exceeds their market value, and so the bias could go in the opposite 
direction.  However evidence presented by Schultz (1999) and Duraisamy (2002) suggests that 
selection has similar effects for men and women.
3   
  A third notable finding is that in about two thirds of the countries, returns to urban residents 
exceed those of rural residents, although the differences are smaller than those between men and 
women.  Estimated returns average 8.3% for urban workers and 7.5% for rural workers.  Again, one 
might suspect that the returns to rural workers are biased upward because a disproportionate share of 
rural workers will work without wages on home enterprises or farms.  Again, the direction of bias is 
unclear, as those opting to work on farm will have a higher value of time than their market 
opportunities.  Additionally, higher wages in cities create an incentive to migrate from rural to urban 
markets, and so rural residents with the highest market skills will likely have moved to the cities.   
                                                 
3 One exception to this generalization that women have higher returns to schooling than men appears in transition 
economies.  On average, women’s rate of return to secondary education is 0.6 percentage points lower and their return to 
university education is 1.3 percentage points lower than estimated returns for men (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004).   4
  Finally, the most telling result from the analysis of differences in returns to schooling across 
groups within countries is that the differences are so small.  Estimated returns are very highly 
correlated across groups.  The correlation in returns is 0.85 both between men and women and between 
urban and rural residents.  Labor markets that reward education highly for men also reward education 
highly for women.  Countries with high returns to education in their urban labor markets also have 
high returns to education in their rural labor market.   
  These returns suggest that across a wide array of countries at all stages of development, 
education consistently offers sizeable positive returns to wage earners—not only to urban male youths, 
but also to women and rural youths.  Nevertheless, a year of schooling will be more productive in some 
environments than in others.  All of the distributions of returns in Table 1 are skewed downward, and 
so there is a tendency to have more extreme outliers at the bottom than the top. One reason that is quite 
plausible but is difficult to illustrate easily is that school quality differs across countries.  However, if 
the economic environment rewards educational investments, then developing country parents have an 
incentive to seek private schools when the public schools are of low quality.  Therefore, it is useful to 
examine other reasons why countries or their citizens may not capture the reward from schooling 
found in other countries.  
 
II. Where are benefits from schooling greatest? 
  Schultz (1975) noted that human capital is most valuable in disequilibrium environments.  
Writing from the perspective of agricultural economies, Schultz argued that in the absence of 
technological change, production shocks, or price shocks, traditional rules of thumb on how to 
efficiently manage a farm would be adequate.  Consistent with that presumption, Fafschamps and 
Quisumbing (1999) and Godoy, Karlan, Rabindran and Huanca (2005) found that schooling has a   5
negligible effect on productivity on traditional farms, even though schooling raises earnings in the 
same locations for farmers engaged in wage work off the farm.   
  On the other hand, human capital has been shown to play a very important role in agricultural 
environments experiencing technological change.  Huffman and Orazem (2006) show that the process 
of economic development almost universally requires an agricultural transition in which dramatic 
increases in the efficiency of food production simultaneously frees up labor for emerging industrial 
sectors while lowering the price of food (and hence raising real wages) in urban areas.  The most 
educated farmers are the first to adopt improved varieties, equipment, and production practices 
(Huffman, 1977; Besley and Case, 1993;  Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004a;  Abdulai and Huffman 
2005).  In India, returns to schooling were highest in areas where Green Revolution technologies were 
most complementary with local agriculture (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996).   
  In order for human capital to attain its highest returns, labor must be able to adapt to 
disequilibria, whether by moving to industries or areas with the strongest labor demand, adopting or 
developing new technologies, or switching occupations to fulfill market needs.  Good adaptive 
decisions require a reward, and so human capital will be most valuable when social or governmental 
institutions place few restrictions on mobility or trade, when wages and prices are flexible, and when 
property rights are enforced.
4  There is no stronger evidence of the role of freer markets in enhancing 
human capital productivity than in the rapid increase in returns to schooling observed in virtually all 
formerly planned economies as they made their transitions toward market systems (Fleisher et al, 
2005).   
  Sen (1999) further stipulates that it is not so much any one economic institution as the 
combination of institutions that is important in defining economic freedom and the ability to seek 
                                                 
4 Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson (2001), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) have examined the role of 
institutions that constrain or enhance mobilityand the exercise of property rights  in retarding or fostering economic growth.     6
rewards for skills.  When we divide our countries into groups based on their relative ranking in the 
Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index,
5 we get a picture of the importance of the overall 
economic environment in fostering returns to schooling (Figure 1).  Because higher index scores 
signify less economic freedom, countries whose index scores are in the lower half of the Economic 
Freedom Index have less regulated economies, fewer restrictions on trade, flexible wage and price 
adjustments, and government enforcement of property rights.  Returns to schooling are, on average, 
just under 10% in these “economically free’ countries.  In contrast, countries in the more regulated half 
of the index have returns to schooling averaging only 6.4%.  The gap in average returns between more 
and less free countries is much larger than the gap in average returns between men and women or 
between urban and rural markets.  More economically free countries have higher average returns at 
both high and low levels of average schooling, a proxy for the level of development in the country.  
This suggests that investments in schooling will be most valuable in countries that allow workers to 
find their highest returns across alternative sectors and occupations.
6    
  There is considerable evidence that parents do respond to rising perceived returns to schooling. 
In India, Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) and Kochar (2004) found that rural enrollments rise in areas 
with greater perceived returns to schooling due to technological innovations or rising urban demand for 
labor.  Evidence from South Asia and Central America suggests that the rapidly growing export-
oriented sectors disproportionately hired more educated youth, and that hiring has frequently targeted 
educated young women.  This has helped to increase enrollment for girls even without an explicit 
program aimed at raising girls’ enrollment (Gruben and McLeod, 2006).  Nevertheless, these responses 
                                                 
5 Information on the Heritage Foundation Index is available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/pdfs/Index2006_Chap5.pdf 
6 The negative estimated returns to schooling came from Azerbaijan in 1995; Moldova in 1998; Cambodia in 1997; and 
Vietnam in 1992 although Moock, Patrinos and Venkataraman (2003) found small but positive returns for Vietnam in 
1992-93.  More recent surveys available for Cambodia and Vietnam have generated positive returns to schooling as those 
countries have liberalized their economies and improved the climate for protection of property.   7
are predicated on the ability of human capital to move to the area or sector where it can find its highest 
potential value in the economy, and on parental ability to perceive those potential rewards.
7 
  Of course, just spending time in school is not enough to generate a return.  More important is 
what is learned during the time in school. Investments of time and money in a child’s schooling that 
fail to produce basic cognitive skills such as literacy are almost surely wasted.  In fact, studies that 
include both years of schooling and measures of cognitive skills find that it is the latter and not the 
former that drive earnings (Glewwe, 2002).  Similarly, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) found that it is 
average cognitive attainment and not average years of schooling that drives economic growth.  More 
recently, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) show that the cognitive skills of the population – rather 
than mere school attainment – are powerfully related to individual earnings, to the distribution of 
income, and to economic growth.  Their empirical results show the importance of both minimal and 
high level skills, the complementarity of skills and the quality of economic institutions, and the 
robustness of the relationship between skills and growth. 
  While time in school does not guarantee the acquisition of cognitive skills, it is almost 
impossible to acquire those skills without formal schooling.  As shown in Figure 2, the probability of 
attaining self-reported literacy rises with years of schooling, although there is considerable variation in 
the pattern across countries.  Children who complete the primary cycle, about six years of schooling, 
are almost certain to attain literacy in most countries.  While it is theoretically possible that these 
children could have attained literacy without schooling, Figure 2 shows that relatively few literate 
individuals never attended school.  This presumption that schooling is needed for literacy underlies the 
Millennium Development Goal of attaining universal primary education (UPE) by 2015. 
                                                 
7 Datt and Ravallion (2002) argue that economic growth in India has tended to benefit most those groups with more 
schooling.  Sources of growth were complementary with skills.   This is consistent with the recommendation that efforts to 
fight poverty through growth must include measures to raise the human capital of the poor.    8
  Various estimates generated by UNESCO, UNICEF, and the World Bank place the annual 
additional cost of attaining UPE at between $9-34 billion.  These estimates use various applications of 
procedures that apply current average costs of schooling to the fraction of children not in school.  Even 
these high cost may be understated because the  children who are currently not in school are 
disproportionately located in areas that are expensive to reach with schooling services or in households 
that are less keen to send children to school.
8 Others are not in school despite having access to local 
schools, and so adding more supply will not address the problem.  We argue that in order to make 
efficient progress toward the UPE goal, we need to identify which illiterate populations can be served 
most economically. 
 
III.  Should investments concentrate on the primary level or other levels? 
  Much of our discussion will concentrate on raising the fraction of literate adults in the world, 
but for many developing countries that have already attained UPE, that level of schooling is no longer 
relevant.  It is useful to comment briefly on why we focus on lower levels of schooling in identifying 
the highest benefit to cost interventions in the schooling arena. 
  It has commonly been presumed that schooling is subject to diminishing returns, so that the 
returns to primary schooling would exceed those for higher levels of schooling.  Estimates of social 
returns to schooling reported by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) support that conjecture.  Reported 
per capita schooling costs also suggest that the highest returns must be at the lowest levels;  
government per pupil costs for secondary schools in low-income countries are more than double the 
costs for primary schools, and the per pupil tertiary costs are nearly 34 times the primary costs.  It is 
unlikely that any gains in relative private returns are large enough to reverse the pattern of diminishing 
social returns to schooling. 
                                                 
8 Glewwe and Zhao (2006) present a summary of these estimates and a critique of the methodologies employed.   9
  Both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence support the view that interventions early in 
life have the highest returns.  Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and Heckman and Masterov (2007) 
present a wealth of evidence that earlier investments in human capital including those occurring before 
the start of the formal schooling are far more cost effective than efforts to improve schooling later in 
life.  It seems that because human capital development builds upon past accumulations of human 
capital, it is extremely important to develop a strong human capital base at an early age.  Numerous 
pathologies including criminal activities, drug abuse, idleness and chronic illnesses can be linked to a 
weak human capital foundation in the form of malnutrition, bad health and poor schooling experienced 
at the youngest ages. 
  Nevertheless, in some settings, particularly those of more advanced developing countries, 
returns may be substantial at the secondary or even tertiary level.    In industrialized economies, private 
returns to tertiary schooling rose relative to returns to secondary schooling as new technologies and 
investments in capital complemented the skills of college graduates (Schultz, 2004b).  One might 
suspect that similar changes are increasing the private returns to those with secondary or tertiary 
educations in developing countries.   
  This is particularly true in countries with strong growth in export trade.  Xu (2000) argued that 
a developing country can expect to attract technology from multinational enterprises only if it has an 
adult population that meets a threshold level of education of roughly 10 years of completed schooling.  
That assessment is consistent with findings that workers in foreign-owned enterprises in Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Guatemala, and elsewhere tend to be drawn from the upper tail of the schooling 
distribution in those countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007),  although the experience in Mexico 
appears to be in the opposite direction (Robertson, 2004).  It is plausible that the rising returns to skill   10
in the export sectors occurs when there is insufficient migration toward growing sectors of the 
economy and/or because there is an insufficient supply of the types of skills exporters demand.   
  The OECD (2000) recently revised the definition of literacy, going well beyond basic facility 
with reading and mathematics to incorporate functioning efficiently in the information age.  This 
presents another illustration of the Schultz hypothesis:  the level of minimal functional literacy rises 
with the level and complexity of the economic environment.  As a country develops, the minimal level 
of schooling required to function effectively will increase.  However, in those economies, many of the 
barriers to obtaining the requisite skills will be falling as the country progresses.  The countries we will 
focus on herein have not yet attained that level of development for a large portion of their citizenry. 
 
IV.  If parents respond to returns, what is the public role in schooling investments? 
  As argued in section II, parents increase the intensity of their investments in schooling when 
expected returns rise.  If true, then why don’t parents select the efficient amount of time to send their 
children to school, the time at which the private rate of return to an additional year of schooling is 
equal to the market rate of return to other investments of comparable risk?  Either there must be returns 
to schooling that are not captured by the households or there must be constraints on household 
schooling investments that prevent them from selecting the optimal investment.   
  Several external benefits are frequently associated with women’s schooling.  The fertility 
transition, the common finding that the number of children per woman declines as economic growth 
occurs, has been tied to increases in women’s value of time as their education increases (King and 
Mason, 2001; Schultz, 2002). Angrist et al (2002) and Schultz(2004a) both found that increased 
schooling from randomly assigned vouchers and conditional cash transfers led to reduced fertility, 
although the evidence was somewhat weaker  in the latter case. Increases in women’s (and men’s)   11
schooling has also been associated with improvements in the health of their children and other family 
members, with improvements in the schooling of their children, and as a consequence, a rising quality 
of life from one generation to the next (de Walque, 2005; Oreopoulos et al, 2006; Paxson and Schady, 
2007).  More schooling is associated with later age of marriage and lower teenage birth rates, which 
improves the health and schooling outcomes of the next generation (Black et al, 2004,  2005a; Cardoso 
and Verner, 2006).  Many of the most recent studies utilize changes in truancy laws to generate 
plausibly exogenous changes in years of schooling (eg, Patrinos and Sakellariou 2005), increasing the 
confidence that these effects of parental schooling on children’s welfare are causal.  While in 
developed countries, some studies find only modest effects of parental schooling on their children 
(Black et al, 2005b), the effect appears to be stronger in developing countries.
 9 
  Markets are often credited with improving the allocation of resources in an economy, but those 
resource allocation decisions require agents who are able to absorb and react to information.  
Schooling is credited with lowering search costs and improving allocative efficiency, which has both 
private and social benefits.  These efficiency gains will be spread broadly in the economy.  For 
example, better educated people are better able to migrate from rural to urban markets or from less 
productive to more productive sectors, helping those markets allocate labor efficiently.  This implies 
that the economy will be producing more output from the same inputs, increasing the total size of the 
pie available.  Not all of these benefits will be captured by the migrants themselves (for example labor 
that does not migrate will get higher wages as the migrants pursue their interests).  Returns to capital 
are also enhanced by efficient allocations of labor.   
                                                 
9 One could argue that to the extent that these transfers of schooling and health are confined within dynastic households, 
they are not really externalities.  Parents will get utility from their children’s health or future welfare.  Nevertheless, there 
may still be external benefits to having healthier and more educated progeny that are not fully captured by the parents and 
their children.   12
  Empirical studies have consistently found that it is the better educated who are the most likely 
to adopt new technologies.  Of course these agents are acting in their own self-interest, but there will 
be benefits that accrue to others as well.  For example, because food demand is relatively inelastic, 
improved productivity in the agricultural sector from newly adopted technologies or enhanced farming 
ability will lower food prices, which raises consumer surplus.  Lower food prices will tend to raise the 
purchasing power of urban wages and will hasten the shift of labor out of agriculture and into the 
industrialized sector of the economy.   
  In Foster and Rosenzweig’s analysis of the distribution of benefits from India’s Green 
Revolution, it is apparent that the technologies were first adopted by relatively skilled farmers in areas 
with complementary land and irrigation.  The social or private returns to the technology would have 
been negligible without a group of farmers able to successfully implement the technologies.  Falling 
food prices did displace some farmers, but the displaced agriculture labor fueled a rural 
industrialization.  There was an expansion of manufacturing employment and increased wages and 
incomes in rural areas that were less suited to the Green Revolution; those areas benefited from the 
increased productivity of the farmers in the Green Revolution districts. 
10 
  Improved schooling opportunities can raise the quality of public servants and hence of public 
good provision.  Indeed, improved human capital is believed to improve the quality of governance in 
democracies.
11  
  Another reason why private schooling decisions may deviate from social optima is that parents 
may face borrowing costs that exceed the market interest rate.  Becker and Tomes (1986) showed that 
if households are credit constrained, they will underinvest in their children’s schooling, but all 
                                                 
10 The need for educated farmers to adopt improved technologies that would raise food yields has become increasingly 
apparent with the recent run-up of food prices and their impact on poverty rates world-wide. This is one of the topics 
covered in the World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development 
11 Haveman and Wolfe (1984) have a detailed review of the sources of private and social returns to schooling.   13
intergenerational transfers will be in the form of human capital and not wealth.  Households that are 
not credit constrained will invest optimally in their children’s schooling and then make any additional 
transfers in physical wealth.  This may be why there is a stronger apparent tie between parental and 
children’s schooling in developing countries.  In developed countries, credit constraints may not be 
important and so variation in children’s schooling is not as strongly tied to parents education or wealth 
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Cameron and Taber, 2004).  However, substantial segments of poorer 
countries are more likely to face credit constraints that will limit children’s schooling opportunities. 
  The best evidence regarding these credit constraints is that child schooling appears to be 
atypically sensitive to unforeseen fluctuations in household income, positive or negative.  Edmonds et 
al (2006) found that unexpected pension income raised schooling of grandchildren in South Africa.  In 
another setting, opening the Vietnam market to trade caused rapid increases in household income that 
increased child schooling in Vietnam (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006). Negative income shocks from 
weather or national recessions cause poor households to reduce child time in school (Jacoby and 
Skoufias, 1997, 1998; Funkhouser (1999); Thomas et al. (2004); Glewwe and Jacoby, 2004).  There is 
evidence that better educated parents can absorb these shocks more effectively (Glewwe and Hall, 
1998). 
  The existence of liquidity constraints creates a second role for government provision of 
schooling, even in the absence of external benefits.  Underinvestment in schooling by poor households 
means that the level of national skills will be lower than optimal.  Furthermore, the underinvestment 
will be concentrated among poor children who will then be consigned to poverty in the future due to 
their poor human capital endowments.  Government provision of schooling can therefore be justified 
also as a means of equalizing the opportunity to escape poverty across households of varying economic 
status.   14
 
V. Where are the most serious gaps in enrollment rates? 
  One of the Millennium Development Goals is to attain universal primary education by 2015.  
Despite the consistency in estimated returns to schooling across countries, genders, and regions within 
countries, it is unlikely that this goal will be met.  This section highlights which groups lag the furthest 
behind in attaining the goal and which lagging groups can be aided in the most cost effective manner. 
  To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, we make use of 72 household data sets on schooling 
attainment compiled by Deon Filmer of the World Bank.  All data sets were collected between 2000-
2006.  We computed the fraction of 20-29 year olds who completed grades 1, 5 and 9 in order to show 
how rapidly educational attainment drops off in these developing countries.  The grade 5 information is 
of particular interest in that completion of five years of schooling represents near assurance of lifetime 
literacy and numeracy.  Separate estimates were generated for males and females and for urban and 
rural residents.   
  Figures 3a-b show the first illustration.  Each point represents paired male and female 
proportions of the 20-29 year old population that completed a given grade level in a country.  Figure 3a 
shows the relationship for urban areas and Figure 3b for rural areas.  The dotted 45
o line indicates 
combinations where males and females are equally likely to attain the grade level.  Values on the axes 
range from 0 to 1 with 1 representing universal attainment.  Larger deviations from the upper right-
hand point (1,1) mean a greater gap from universal attainment of a given grade level. 
  The average schooling attainment combinations also indicated for each grade level using 
dashed lines. Note that by construction, the pattern of dots will move toward the origin as the level of 
schooling increases because the fraction completing grade 9 or more must be smaller than the fraction 
completing at least grade 5 which will, in turn, be smaller than the fraction completing grade 1.   15
  Several facts emerge.  First, most of the grade 5 points lie well below (1,1), and so most 
developing countries have yet to meet the goal of UPE.  This is particularly true in rural areas.  In 
urban areas, the norm is for 77% of women and 84% of men to complete grade 5.  In rural areas, the 
norms are 54% and 63% respectively.  Aggregating across the 72 developing countries using 
population weights, 13% of urban residents and 28% of rural residents fail to complete 5 years of 
schooling. Second, in both urban and rural markets most combinations lie below the 45
o line, 
indicating that on average, males are more likely to reach each grade level than females.  Women are 
farther away from UPE than men.  The population-weighted aggregates are that 20% of men and 26% 
of women fail to complete 5 years of schooling.  Nevertheless, in some countries, girls do receive more 
schooling than boys.  Third, rural points tend to be farther from the 45
o line, and so male-female 
schooling gaps tend to be largest in rural areas.  Fourth, there is a very high correlation in educational 
outcomes across demographic groups.  Countries with high boys’ enrollment rates also tend to have 
high girls’ enrollment rates.  Countries with high urban education rates have high rural rates as well. 
Finally, there is considerable heterogeneity across countries in schooling attainment levels, and so it is 
unlikely that the same strategy to raise enrollments would work in all countries.  Some have yet to get 
a majority of children to complete grade 1 while others are approaching universal completion of grade 
9, at least in their urban areas.  
  Figures 4a and 4b repeat the exercise except that the points are combinations of urban and rural 
schooling attainment levels for males and females separately.  Almost all combinations lie below the 
45
o line, indicating that urban residents get more schooling than rural residents.  The degree of 
schooling inequality between urban and rural children, as indicated by the distance from the 45
o line, 
increases with schooling level. Only 8% of urban males fail to complete the first grade, compared to 
22% of rural males.  Sixteen percent of urban males and 37% of rural males failed to complete grade 5,   16
the gaps that must be filled to attain UPE.  For both urban and rural males, there is a sharp drop off in 
attainment after grade 5.  In only 60% of countries do a majority of male children complete grade 9, 
and only rarely do rural males reach that level.   
  Schooling levels are even lower for females.  As shown in Figure 4b, almost all combinations 
lie below the 45
o line indicating that urban females almost always get more schooling than their rural 
counterparts.  A large advantage for urban females opens up immediately upon school entry.   Just over 
two-thirds of rural females complete one year of schooling, but only 54% manage to complete grade 5.  
Of urban females, 86% complete at least one year of schooling and 77% complete grade 5.  The UPE 
goal has not yet been satisfied for about one quarter of urban girls and one half of rural girls in 
developing countries.   Consequently, while problems are not the same across countries, a significant 
proportion of developing countries have yet to attain the UPE goal.  
 
VI. Where and how can schooling be increased most efficiently?  
  Given the substantial gap from UPE, our task is to identify where schooling attainment can be 
expanded most efficiently.  In Table 2, we present the stylized facts regarding the population of youth 
aged 15-19 that failed to complete grade 5 by region of the world.  All youth in this age range should 
have been able to complete grade 5.  We decompose the population failing to complete grade 5 into 
two groups, those who never went to school and those who dropped out before completing grade 5.  
Our estimate of those who never went to school is given by the fraction of 14-year olds who never 
attended.  We present the data by population-weighted averages of geographic regions.   
  Our contention is that it is less expensive to get the children who have dropped out to complete 
the primary cycle than it is to get children who never attended school to attain literacy.  We know that 
for children who at least started school, there exists school capacity that induced parents to send the   17
child to school.  In addition, these parents at least cared enough about their children’s schooling to 
make an initial investment of child time.  It is more difficult to induce parents who have not sent their 
children to school to enroll the child for the first time and to take the child through the primary cycle.  
The reason we focus on completing at least five grades is the result from Figure 2 that five grades are 
sufficient to attain literacy.  Investments that do not successfully carry the child through grade five are 
likely to be wasted. 
  The fraction of children not completing grade five varies from very small proportions in China 
and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to over 40% of children in Africa.  Worldwide, excluding 
China and the Eastern Europe and Central Asian countries, 30% of children in developing countries 
fail to complete the fifth grade.  Of these, 55% started school but drop out.  To put these proportions 
into perspective, about 112 million children were born in developing countries in 2004.  Assuming that 
current patterns do not change between 2004 and 2015, we estimate that 26 million of these children 
will fail to complete grade 5. Of these, 14.4 million will start school and drop out before attaining 
literacy and numeracy.
12  Those 14.4 million represent the most cost effective target for raising literacy 
rates in the world.  If these 14.4 million children were able to complete the primary cycle, the gap from 
UPE in these countries will decrease from 23% to 10%. 
  The other statistics in Table 2 demonstrate that for almost all demographic groups, substantial 
progress toward UPE can be made by reducing dropouts.  Aggregating across countries, 61% of males 
and 49% of females who failed to complete grade 5 did so because they dropped out.  The 
corresponding ratios for urban and rural residents are 62% and 55% respectively.  We also show 
information on children in the lowest two quintiles of the income distribution. 
                                                 
12 Our fraction of children not completing grade 5 is reasonably close to the UNESCO estimate of the fraction of children 
who are illiterate.   18
  We can also show the importance of household income as a factor influencing child schooling 
attainment.  The bottom of Table 2 includes the school entry, completion and dropout rates for children 
living in households in the poorest two income quintiles.  Children in the poorest households fail to 
complete grade five in higher proportions in every part of the world.  Thirty-seven percent of the 
poorest children fail to complete grade five compared to 23% overall.   Of these, 54% dropped out 
after starting school.  For all these groups, therefore, reducing the incentives to dropout would generate 
substantial progress toward Universal Primary Education for all demographic groups in all regions of 
the developing world. 
 
VII. Supply-side interventions 
  There are two avenues through which governments can influence parental schooling choices.  
Supply-side policies aim to improve the quantity or quality of schooling offered.  These policies 
include direct provision of newly constructed schools or of school supplies by the central government, 
but they can also involve the decentralization of school control to local authorities who are believed to 
be able to allocate resources more efficiently to meet school needs.  Demand-side policies attempt to 
directly influence parental incentives to allocate more of their children’s time to school.   We will 
argue that demand-side policies show more promise for cost-effective means of enhancing schooling 
outcomes, but we will first explain why we view supply-side mechanisms as less promising. 
1) If you build it, they may not come. 
  The biggest concern with new school construction is that most of the costs of new building and 
staffing are incurred before we find out if parents will send their children to the school.  Duflo’s (2001) 
analysis of Indonesia’s massive public works project that doubled the number of primary schools in a 
six year period resulted in a statistically significant but small 3% increase in average years of   19
schooling. Similarly, Filmer’s (2004) analysis of the relationship between distance and enrollments 
across 21 developing countries generally found very small marginal effects of lowering distance.  
Enrollment does not appear to be highly sensitive to the distance to the nearest school.  This does not 
imply that school provision is unimportant—only that the existing supply is already located in the most 
dense child populations.  New schools will be disproportionately located in relatively remote places 
where there are relatively few children to add to the rolls and relatively high costs of adding capacity. 
  Frequently forgotten in the analysis of new school construction projects is that they may cause 
some students currently going to private schools to switch to the new public schools.  This is 
particularly true in urban areas of developing countries where private schools are more plentiful.  As 
public school supply is expanded, some private school students are likely to switch to public schools 
and some private schools will close, diminishing the benefits of the supply expansion.
13  In rural areas, 
where private schools are frequently nonexistent, there is no such crowding out effect of government 
school expansion. 
2) Quality matters, but we don’t know how to foster quality 
    It is undoubtedly true that higher quality schools enhance human capital production and raise 
the demand for education.  However, research has failed to identify how to foster improved quality.  
For example, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) found that good teachers systematically produce 
better academic outcomes than do bad teachers.  Unfortunately, good teachers and bad teachers look 
very much alike statistically—they have the same education levels, similar demographics, receive the 
same in-service training and are compensated similarly.  In other words, teacher quality matters, but 
we don’t know what matters for teacher quality.  As teachers represent 74% of recurring school 
expenditures in developing countries (Bruns et al, 2003), it would seem that any policy aimed at 
improving school quality would have to confront teacher quality.  The lack of agreement about how to 
                                                 
13 See Jimenez and Sawada (2001).   20
foster teacher quality thwarts any general prescription regarding likely cost-effective avenues for 
improvement. 
  There have been many studies of the educational production process with very inconsistent 
findings.  Teacher or school attributes that appear critically important for student performance in one 
study prove unimportant or even detrimental in another.  Experimental designs don’t really resolve the 
problem because the value of one type of input (textbooks, say) may depend on what other assets the 
school has available (trained teachers, English medium instruction).  A particular experimental 
infusion of inputs may succeed in some settings and not others, complicating the applicability of the 
lessons to other schools and settings.  As an example, Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin (2009) found that 
making textbooks more available in Kenya benefited students in the upper tail of the ability 
distribution, who were prepared for the English medium texts, but the texts had no impact on average 
and below average students, most of whom could not read those textbooks. 
    Chaudhury et al (2006) report that in developing countries, teachers are absent about 20% of 
the time.  Such absenteeism rates have a tremendous impact on the education sector. In terms of direct 
loss of financing, it is estimated that between 10 and 24 percent of recurrent primary education 
expenditures are currently lost to teacher absenteeism. Losses from teacher absenteeism range from 
$16 million per year in Ecuador to $2 billion per year in India (Patrinos and Kagia 2007).  Many of the 
absences are perfectly legal as schools offer numerous benefits for teachers, including many days of 
sick leave and annual leave.  One might guess that simply removing these legal absences would help 
resolve the problem, except that comparisons of spot-check attendances with official attendance 
registries indicates that off-contract absences are rarely reported.  Duflo and Hanna (2005) report on 
the effect of placing cameras with time indicators into remotely sited schools in India. Compared to 
schools without cameras, teacher attendance rises substantially.  When teachers attend more regularly,   21
their students attend more regularly as well, and the students appear to perform better on standardized 
tests. This experiment holds promise as a means of reducing shirking by teachers in a cost-effective 
manner, but we do not yet have enough information in other settings to know if these results 
generalize.   
  It is undoubtedly true that higher quality schools enhance human capital production and raise 
school demand.  However, our lack of clear rules of thumb regarding how to improve school quality 
suggest that we are not yet prepared to make general propositions regarding likely cost-effective 
avenues for improvement. 
3) Are better managed schools better, or are better schools better managed? 
  International agencies have made decentralization of school management a central theme of 
new efforts to improve the efficiency of public service delivery in developing countries (Bardhan, 
2005).  The clear attraction of the strategy is that it offers the potential of improving school outcomes 
without spending more on the schools—we simply “spend smarter and not harder”, to modify the 
common aphorism.  The available evidence, even that often used by proponents of decentralization, is 
really too uncertain to provide a high degree of confidence that local management can work in all 
settings, without complementary investments. Studies by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) of the EDUCO
14 
schools in El Salvador and by King and Ozler (2001) of the autonomous schools in Nicaragua found 
that schools that exercised more local autonomy experienced gains in student attendance or test scores  
compared to other schools.  However, participating schools are not randomly drawn – local authorities 
had to self-select into the programs and would be dropped if they did not fulfill their obligations.  It is 
likely that the schools opting to accept local responsibility differ in ways that could vary school 
outcomes compared to communities that did not elect to participate in the program.  In other words, a 
                                                 
14 EDUCO comes from the Spanish acronym “Educacion con Participacion de la Comunidad” or “Community Managed 
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finding that autonomous schools outperform schools that are not autonomous does not imply that the 
nonautonomous schools would have had better outcomes if they too had become autonomous. 
  More recent papers continue to find that autonomous schools differ in important ways from 
those that do not exercise such authority.  Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio-Codina (2006) find that 
Mexico’s rural school-based management intervention resulted in a small but statistically significant 
reduction in repetition and failure rates for schools in poor areas. Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky 
(2005) found that early adopters of a school management program in Argentina experienced the largest 
improvements in schooling outcomes.  Again, the sorting of schools into autonomous and 
nonautonomous groups is not random.  In Mexico, schools choose to participate in the program.  In 
Argentina, the early adopters were the wealthiest schools. 
  Even if decentralization were known to raise schooling outcomes using the same inputs, it is 
not clear how governments can best foster decentralization.  Gunnarsson et al (2007) found that most 
of the variation in the practice of local school autonomy occurs within and not between countries, 
suggesting that national policies to foster decentralized decision-making may have little effect on 
actual school autonomy. 
  We may eventually have a better grasp of how to foster local school management and how to 
generate the skills needed to manage schools in areas that do not already have those skills.  At the 
current level of knowledge, it is premature to make a general recommendation that local school 
management will improve schooling outcomes.  
4) Returns to increased school supply come after a long lag 
  Supply-side interventions generally require the allocation of funds upfront with the hoped for 
child or parental response only becoming apparent later. Once built, there is no economic return to a 
new school unless children enroll, but it may be five years before children attain permanent literacy.  It   23
may take some time for parents to perceive school quality improvements.  Similarly, it may take some 
time for teachers and students to respond to better local school management.  Perhaps even more 
important is that the returns to the parents will come in the form of increased child earnings that are far 
into the future and heavily discounted relative to the immediate direct and opportunity costs parents 
face in sending their children to school.  The combination of upfront costs, uncertain response, and 
delayed benefits place supply-side interventions at a cost-benefit disadvantage compared to the 
demand side alternatives discussed in the next section. 
  When conducting benefit-cost comparisons, efforts to shift the demand for schooling have 
some distinct advantages over efforts to influence supply.  Demand-side stimulus can be targeted to the 
particular population currently not in school, whereas supply side interventions will generally involve 
some redistribution of children who are already in school to new schools.  Demand-side interventions 
can be made contingent on the child being in school, meaning that payment occurs only if the program 
is working.  In contrast, supply-side interventions generally require the allocation of funds upfront with 
the hoped for child or parental response only becoming apparent later.  Demand-side interventions 
have benefits to the household that are discounted less heavily because they can put money in the 
parents’ pockets immediately, either by lowering schooling costs or providing transfer payments in 
exchange for the child being in school.  The parents also see the benefits immediately rather than the 
less apparent return in the form of future income the child will earn as an adult.  Finally, from the 
societal perspective, demand-side interventions can influence behavior immediately and so they have 
an advantage relative to the more heavily discounted benefits of supply-side interventions, at least in 
terms of increasing enrollment.  Even so, some supply-side interventions may be justified by their 
impact on learning outcomes and by equity considerations, even though they could not yet be justified 
under strict comparisons of benefits against costs.  Adding schools to rural areas is expensive, and   24
there may be insufficient numbers of students to take advantage of the returns to scale needed to make 
the school cost-effective, even with 100% enrollment.  Similarly, some reforms may be needed to shift 
the incentives for teachers or the aspirations of students, even if the reforms will take hold only over a 
long time horizon. 
 
VIII. Demand-side interventions 
  This section reviews three types of interventions: interventions in child health or nutrition that 
attempt to improve the child’s physical or mental ability to learn; efforts to lower the cost of public or 
private schooling that enhance households’ ability to pay for schooling; and income transfers to 
households that are made conditional on the child’s enrollment, which will make schooling more 
affordable and lower the opportunity cost of children’s time in school.   
  Demand side interventions will be most effective in settings with high income and price 
elasticities of demand for schooling and where the supply of schooling is also very elastic with respect 
to household willingness to pay for schooling.  Since stimulating demand in settings where additional 
school space cannot accommodate more students will have little impact, demand-side strategies work 
best where there is excess capacity in existing schools, which allows more children to be added at a 
low marginal cost. 
a: Health and schooling 
  There is a high incidence of malnutrition in developing countries.  UNICEF compilations 
indicate that 28% of children in developing countries are moderately or severely undernourished.  In 
areas where malnutrition is common, nutritional supplements and/or treatments for intestinal diseases 
or parasites offer an inexpensive way to raise school attendance and physical and mental capacity.   25
  Numerous policies aimed at improving child health have been administered to children 
currently in school, including the distribution of nutrition supplements, provision of school lunches, 
school-based immunization programs, and delivery of health education for students.  Programs have 
also been implemented to improve the health of infants and preschool-age children, and these 
programs are the ones that have been most rigorously evaluated. 
  There is substantial evidence that malnutrition early in life compromises both cognitive and 
physical development in a way that may be difficult to reverse through better nutrition later in life.  For 
example, Glewwe, Jacoby and King (2001) found that controlling for other household background 
measures, children who were malnourished early in life start school later, complete fewer years of 
schooling, and learn less per year of schooling.  Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2003) report similar 
findings for children who were malnourished because of exposure to civil war and drought in 
Zimbabwe.  Evaluations of efforts to provide nutritional supplements to at-risk preschool children in 
developed countries have shown permanent improvements in physical stature and cognitive 
development, both of which can raise life-time earnings.
15   
  Behrman, Cheng, and Todd (2004) conducted an experimental evaluation of the Proyecto 
Integral de Desarrollo Infantil (PIDI) program in Bolivia.  This program provides daycare, nutritional 
inputs, and preschool activities for low-income children aged 6-72 months. For children exposed to the 
program for periods exceeding one year, the authors report permanent gains in cognitive development 
and fine motor skills.  Grantham-McGregor et al. (1991) report comparable findings for a similar 
program aimed at stunted infants in Jamaica, as do Armecin et al. (2005) for low-income rural 
households in the Philippines.  Vermeersch and Kremer found that providing free breakfast to 
                                                 
15 There have been several reviews of early childhood interventions that combine schooling and nutrition in developed 
countries.  Reviews by Currie (2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and Heckman and Masterove (2007) conclude that the 
benefits of these program frequently exceed their costs and that the programs dominate interventions that occur later in life.  
Recipients of early childhood training are less likely to drop out of school or engage in criminal activities.  Recipients of 
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preschoolers raised attendance by 30% in Kenya but did not raise average measured skills. An analysis 
of a program that combined deworming medication with an iron supplement for preschoolers in India 
also raised attendance and physical stature (Bobonis, Miguel and Sharma, 2004). 
  Health programs have been shown to raise schooling investments for young school-aged 
children as well.  Afridi (2007a,b) found that a school lunch program in India increased attendance of 
girls but not of boys.  The program did lower the incidence of malnutrition for both boys and girls.  
This program costs just pennies per day.  In a widely cited study, Miguel and Kremer (2004) examined 
the impact of a program that administered deworming medicine to school children in Kenya.  The 
treated children increased their attendance by 0.15 years per pupil, at an implicit cost of only $3.50 per 
child per year of schooling.   
  Nutritional programs can even have benefits at older ages.  McGuire (1996) reports that giving 
iron supplements to secondary school age children (13-15 years) in a low income country can raise 
cognitive abilities by 5-25% or the equivalent of 0.5 years of schooling.  Brown et al (2006) found that 
provision of iron supplements and treatments for intestinal parasites to adult apparel factory workers in 
India improved productivity.  Even for these teenage or older recipients, nutritional supplements are 
inexpensive and can generate benefits well in excess of costs.  
  One reason these health interventions can be viewed as particularly cost-effective in raising 
schooling investments is that the schooling is a collateral benefit.  The main aim for most of these 
programs is to improve child health, which is valuable in itself, and so raises the benefits side of the 
equation.  On the cost side, expenses are incurred only if the children participate and so there is much 
less potential for wasted investments than is the case for supply-side interventions. 
  How generalizable are these studies to other developing country settings?  Miguel and Kremer 
(2004) argue that the potential impact of deworming on school attendance could be very large if   27
expanded world-wide, in that 25% of children in developing countries are infected.  However, it is 
useful to keep in mind that the impact is in raising the attendance of children already in school and not 
necessarily inducing children not in school to enroll.  Secondly, their population of students had an 
infection rate of 92% and so the magnitude of the impact is likely related to fact that they selected sites 
most in need of the intervention—areas with more modest infection rates would have smaller program 
impacts.  Demographic and Health Survey data suggest that health reasons are less often cited as a 
reason for children not being in school than are child work inside or outside the home, poverty, or lack 
of interest on the part of the child (Table 3). Health is cited more often in Africa and in urban areas of 
Latin America, but is less often cited elsewhere.  
  Nevertheless, nutrition and health programs for preschool age as well as school age children 
will have particular relevance for the poorest households, who have a disproportionate share of the 
children who drop out before completing five grades.  Many of these programs are relatively 
inexpensive to deliver.  Most importantly, the benefits they offer from improved health alone may be 
much larger than the expense, even if they have little impact on schooling.  
  b: Lowering schooling costs 
  In many developing countries, parents face user fees for access to basic social services such as 
health care, sanitation, potable water or schooling.  These fees may discourage service utilization by 
the most vulnerable children:  girls; the poor; the rural; the disabled; and minority ethnic or racial 
groups.  If widespread, such user fees could be a significant barrier to the achievement of universal 
basic education and health care.   
1) Primary school fees are commonly charged in developing countries 
  In 2005, the World Bank commissioned a survey of primary school fees in developing 93 
countries (Kattan, 2006).  The findings show a strong trend toward reducing the price of attending   28
primary school in developing countries.  Whereas only 3 countries offered free primary schools before 
2000, 16 had eliminated all school fees by 2005. The reduction or elimination of universal fees for 
primary schooling has been particularly noticeable in Africa where countries such as Cameroon, 
Lesotho, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have all reduced or eliminated fees since 2000.  In fact, 
one could conclude that primary school fees do not represent a problem in that only 18% of the 93 
developing countries officially charge tuition for primary schools.   
  Nevertheless, the vast majority of parents in developing countries still face private costs of 
sending their children to primary school, and these costs are often large relative to measures of 
household ability to pay.  Even when government policy prohibits tuition, fees may be charged 
informally.  Informal tuition is charged in 7% of the countries, raising the percentage charging primary 
school tuition to 25%.  Even more important, as shown in Table 4, countries charge a variety of fees 
associated with primary schooling, even when there is no tuition.  Of the 69 countries that have free 
primary school tuition, only 16 actually offer free access to primary schools.  The rest of the countries 
charge alternate fees for textbooks, uniforms, school support, or other mandated payments for 
accessing the school.   
  The most common of these is a fee charged by a Parent-Teacher Association or other 
community association that supports the school.  While these fees may be voluntarily paid by 
households, failure to pay can lead to expulsion in other places.  In addition, these fees tend to increase 
as tuition or other explicit fees are reduced.  They are charged in 30% of the countries despite official 
policies stipulating that such fees are not to be charged. 
  In at least one –quarter of the countries, parents are charged for textbooks.  Over one-third of 
the countries charge for uniforms and for other fees associated with school activities.  Overall, 63% of 
the developing countries have official policies to charge at least one of the five types of primary school   29
fees considered.  Fees are charged informally for at least one of the five fees in 35% of the countries.  
In total, parents in 84% of the developing countries have to pay either formal or informal fees to send 
their children to primary school.  These fees are required in virtually all parts of the world including 
the two most populous, India and China.  They are commonly charged in the poorest countries in the 
world: 82% of the countries in Africa; 63% of the South Asian countries; 79% of the Latin American 
countries, and 92% of the countries in East Asia.  If these fees retard investments in primary education, 
then their impact is truly world-wide. 
  These fees can represent a significant burden to parents, particularly for the poorest households.  
Across 34 countries for which fee information was available, primary school fees represented over 
10% of average household expenditures in 6; between 5-10% in another 6.  The burden is greatest on 
the poor.  A study by Oxfam (2001) found that the poorest two household income quintiles in 
developing countries average over 10% of their incomes on primary schooling.  A study of household 
expenditure patterns in Bangladesh, Nepal, Uganda and Zambia found that only food (and in one case, 
clothing) takes a greater share of household expenditures in those poor countries (Boyle et al, 2002).  
 
2) School fees adversely affect enrollments of disadvantaged groups 
  School fees will have an atypically large impact on enrollments of children that are particularly 
price sensitive.  Orazem and King (2008) argued that the most price sensitive groups are likely to be 
rural residents, girls and the poor.  If true, programs that uniformly reduce the price of primary 
schooling for all children will disproportionately increase enrollments of girls, rural children and the 
poor, the very groups that have been shown to lag in our education measure in Table 2 and in Figures 3 
and 4.  Kattan’s (2006) review of the empirical record found large increases in enrollment in the 
countries that eliminated primary school fees.  In the subset of countries where more detailed analysis   30
was available, the most rapid increases in enrollments have been for poor, female, and rural children.  
Additionally, general fee reductions in Kenya, Lesotho and Tanzania led to rising enrollments for 
orphans and children of parents with HIV/AIDS. 
  These findings of large enrollment responses to school fee reductions hold up in more careful 
evaluations that control for competing explanations. A rigorous evaluation is available of a program in 
Bogota, Colombia which was launched in 2004.  The user fee reduction program, known as Gratuidad, 
was well-targeted, using a proxy-mean index, such that the probability that households benefit from the 
fee reduction is a discontinuous function of their score.  This fact allowed Barrera-Osorio et al (2007) 
to implement a regression discontinuity design to estimate the program’s effect.  The results suggest 
that the program had a significant impact.  The fee reductions offered to students from the poorest 
families had a positive effect on enrollment in primary and secondary schooling.  The estimates 
suggest that the program raises the probability of enrollment for primary-aged students by about 3 
percent and for secondary school-aged students by about 6 percent.  These positive effects seem to be 
larger for at-risk students, and to not vary by gender. 
  Fafchamps and Minten (2007) took advantage of a unique political crisis to observe how 
parents respond to schooling costs.  In Madagascar, supporters of a defeated presidential candidate 
imposed a blockade of the central highlands of Madagascar that disrupted the delivery of all public 
services including education. Enrolment in rural primary schools was found to withstand the effect of 
the crisis.  After the blockade was broken, the government suspended user fees for public services 
including school fees to help the communities recover from the economic consequences of the 
blockade. The fee suspensions were not applied immediately in all rural communes, and so the authors 
could compare enrollment changes in areas with and without user fees. They found that suspension of 
user fees resulted in significant increases in school enrolment.   31
  Evaluations have found substantial increases in enrollment even from modest reductions in the 
costs parents face from sending their children to school.  A program that cut household costs of 
uniforms and school materials in Kenya, at a cost of about $15 per child, increased years of schooling 
completed by 15% (Kremer, Moulin and Namunyu, 2003) .  This is an important result in that it may 
not be necessary to eliminate all types of fees to get the desired behavioral response in terms of child 
time in school.  Even places that eliminated fees officially often still have informal fees to help support 
school functions. 
  A case in point is the best known and most studied case of school user fee removal: that of 
Uganda which removed user fees in 1997 as part of the effort to achieve universal primary education 
(UPE).  Note that in Uganda, fees are still charged legally for textbooks, uniforms, and other school 
functions.  Nevertheless, Deininger (2003) found that elimination of primary school tuition lowered 
costs by 60% on average or by about $16 per child.  As a result, enrollments increased by 60%.  
Consistent with the presumption of larger price elasticities in rural areas, rural enrollments more than 
doubled while urban enrollments rose by only 16%.  Using regression discontinuity and difference-in-
difference estimation techniques, Grogan (2006) and Nishimura et al (2008) found that the reduction in 
fees led to a reduction in delayed enrolments.  The Nishimura et al analysis concluded that grade 
completion rates up to the fifth grade rose, with especially large effects among girls from poor 
households.   
  These very large responses to school price reductions are the best argument for demand-side 
efforts to improve literacy.  The contrast with the very small increase in schooling that resulted from 
the doubling of the number of schools in Indonesia reported by Duflo (2001) is striking.  For cost-
benefit comparisons, we find that relatively low-cost fee reductions result in much large behavioral 
responses than has been obtained from supply-side interventions.  Nevertheless, there is a significant   32
concern that these large enrollment increases can overtax the ability of the country to provide a 
productive school environment.  
 
3) Reduction in user fees threatens school quality 
  The Uganda case also points out a potential problem with reliance on user fee reduction or 
elimination to attain UPE.  The resulting enrollment expansion in Uganda came at the cost of 
considerable crowding as school supplies did not keep up.  Pupil teacher ratios rose from 48:1 to 70:1 
in rural areas and from 38:1 to 65:1 overall. Similarly, in the India school meal program, Afridi reports 
that pupil teacher ratios were higher in participating classrooms because supply did not keep up with 
demand.  This tradeoff between increased schooling demand and reductions in the quality of schooling 
appears to be a general characteristic of programs aimed at reducing user fees.  Tiongson’s (2005) 
review of 20 studies across 10 countries found that in all cases, enrollments rose. But, in the 15 studies 
that considered the issue, measures of school quality fell in every case but one. 
  The loss in quality is not surprising—fees paid by parents can be a high fraction of the total 
financial support for a school.  Private fees account for over half the resources available to primary 
schools in Cambodia, and accounted for over half the revenues available to the schools in Uganda and 
Zambia before the elimination of fees.  Even after the elimination of legal school fees, informal fees 
still account for 80% of school expenditures in Malawi.  In developing countries where the taxing 
authority is weak, charging fee for services rendered may be the only way for public agencies to 
recover costs.  It is not surprising that the elimination or reduction of those fees creates a strain on 
service delivery and quality. 
  It is not clear how damaging this crowding is to student learning, but presumably, children who 
were already in school may be negatively affected when these programs raise the number of students   33
per teacher.  Again, the Uganda case provides careful studies that address this issue.  The Grogan study 
found that following the fee reduction, there was a 10 percent fall in the probability that a publicly-
schooled child of a given age and socioeconomic characteristics was able to complete a simple reading 
test contained in the 2001 Demographic and Health Survey Education Supplement.  The Nishimura et 
al study also found evidence of increased inefficiency: an increased likelihood that children who start 
school will drop out before completion. 
  We should emphasize that any program that increases enrollments atypically for the most 
disadvantaged groups would almost certainly result in a reduction in average measures of academic 
success.  That is because the population of children in school will be weighted more heavily toward 
groups who would be expected to have more difficulty in school.  The better measure of the net gain 
versus loss from the program is whether the cognitive gains from increased enrollments outweigh the 
losses attributable to overcrowding and reduced school quality.  In the case of Uganda, it seems that 
the gains clearly outweigh the losses.  A back-of-the-envelope computation suggests that even with a 
10% increase in academic failure conditional on having entered school, the 60% increase in 
enrollments suggests that the fraction of children attaining literacy increased by 44%. 
 
4) Ways to reduce user fees without sacrificing school quality 
  It is too simplistic to argue that cost reductions would only be imposed where there is excess 
school capacity and so we can avoid the added costs of hiring more teachers and building more 
schools.  While we have demonstrated that the fraction of dropouts is large relative to the total number 
of children failing to complete the primary cycle and so potential capacity exists to meet their needs, in 
practice we know that some children will enter school who previously would not have enrolled at all.    34
These first-time entrants will increase the number of children relative to teachers and will eventually 
necessitate additional resources in order to maintain quality. 
  Some have argued that the only way to reduce user fees in schooling is to have a coincident 
commitment to increase public support of the schools to replace lost revenues.  The strongest support 
for this view comes from the literature on user fees in health care.  Removal of user fees increases 
usage, especially by the poor.  A review of 27 studies suggests that this policy has been most 
successful when supported by supply-side measures that remove other barriers to access (James et al, 
2006).  However, there are mechanisms by which demand-side measures can still increase utilization 
without sacrificing school resources. 
  The most obvious of these is to target the fee reduction to the most disadvantaged groups: the 
poor, female, rural, disabled or minority children who are underserved by the for fee service.  These 
targeted scholarships maintain payments from those best able to pay who are already accessing schools 
while increasing enrollments of the most vulnerable.  There is considerable experience with local 
targeting to identify those most deserving of public transfers at relatively low cost (Alderman, 2001; 
Faguet, 2004; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005).  Such efforts would lower the adverse impact of the 
demand response on school quality for those already in school. 
5) The private sector may be induced to provide some of the necessary supply 
  The most promising mechanisms to reduce schooling costs without sacrificing quality is to 
provide the targeted poor with the resources needed to pay for the costs of the schooling.  These 
vouchers could be used for support of public or quasi-public schools through the use of capitation 
grants, per pupil payments that are made directly to the school.  They can be used to induce new 
private suppliers of the service when local supply is insufficient.  Finally, they can be directed to   35
utilize existing excess capacity ion private schools if the existing public schools are oversubscribed.  
We have had successful examples of each of these mechanisms in developing countries. 
  The availability of less expensive teaching and infrastructure inputs is a major reason to 
consider private rather than government school options to serve the expanding demand for schooling.  
James (1993) demonstrated that in many developing countries, private schools are an important 
component of school supply.  In many countries, private schools have excess capacity as measured by 
their relatively low numbers of students per teacher.  In addition, private schools may have a lower 
marginal cost of adding additional capacity than do government schools.  In these circumstances, 
modest public subsidies that induce private school suppliers to contribute additional resources may 
increase enrollments at a fraction of the cost of pure public provision of schooling. 
  One way to accomplish this objective is through capitation grants to school operators.  A 
program in Balochistan province in Pakistan attempted to spur both the demand for schooling among 
girls and to provide an incentive for private school entry by providing scholarships to girls.  Randomly 
selected neighborhoods were given the option of packaging up to 100 girls’ scholarships of 100 rupees 
per month (equivalent to $3) to try to induce a school operator to open a school in the area.  The 
scholarship offered declined over time, falling to zero after four years.  In urban areas, even this 
modest subsidy was sufficient to induce new schools to open (Kim, Alderman and Orazem, 1999), and 
enrollments for both girls and boys rose relative to enrollments in control neighborhoods.  A similar 
program in rural areas enabled schools to open, but the communities were too poor and the number of 
girls too few to allow the schools to become self-sustaining (Alderman, Kim and Orazem, 2001).  This 
raises an important lesson for the likely success of private school options to raise enrollments—
invariably they will be most successful in areas that would have been able to support private schools in   36
the absence of a subsidy, in other words, places with the greatest elasticity of supply for private 
schools.  
  In the Balochistan case, the privately managed scholarship schools were opened at one-quarter 
of the cost of a public school, in part because the schools were able to access property at a much lower 
cost than building a school and because the schools were able to hire teachers at well below the 
government pay scale. Despite that fact, school quality was sufficiently high that students in the newly 
formed scholarship schools outperformed students from similar backgrounds in government schools. 
  In areas where existing private schools are undersubscribed, vouchers may be an excellent 
mechanism by which governments can expand access less expensively than by building additional 
government schools.  One example of this strategy was the Colombia PACES program that provided 
subsidies to municipalities to provide secondary school vouchers to poor children. There was ample 
evidence that the existing government school supply was insufficient to meet demand, and that private 
schools could add additional students without requiring additional teachers or classrooms  (King, 
Orazem and Wohlgemuth, 1999).  Vouchers were offered only to children in the lowest socioeconomic 
strata in municipalities where private schools had committed to participate.  The program cost of $193  
(Knowles and Behrman , 2005) is much higher than the cost of the primary school programs discussed 
above.  Because the Colombia voucher aimed at secondary students, the opportunity cost of the 
children’s time is much higher than would be the case if they were of primary school age.   
  Angrist et al (2002, 2006) demonstrated that children who were randomly sorted into the 
program were 10% more likely to complete the 8
th grade and also scored 0.2 standard deviations higher 
on standardized tests, equivalent to adding an additional year of school.  For those in doubt of external 
benefits from education, it is interesting that voucher recipients also were less likely to marry young or   37
cohabit and were less likely to engage in child labor.  A follow-up analysis confirmed that educational 
gains were permanent and not transitory.   
  A program in India provides a third mechanism to enable poor households to enroll their 
children in school.  In many developing countries, students often participate in tutoring after school, 
with the tutoring often provided by the same teacher they have in class.  Poor children cannot afford 
these services and may fall behind their peers.  A program in India hired local women with high school 
degrees to provide remedial tutoring to grade 3 and 4 children who had fallen behind in school 
(Banerjee et al, 2007).  At a cost of $5 per child, the program raised the likelihood of a child 
performing at first grade math level by 11.9 percentage points and at second grade language levels by 
9.9 percentage points.  By the end of the two year program, children were performing on average 0.28 
standard deviations higher on the test scores, roughly equivalent to having attained one additional year 
of schooling. 
  The reason the program is so inexpensive is that they hired less qualified tutors at the market 
rate rather than requiring teaching certifications and paying the government rate for teachers.  These 
tutors (called balsakhis or children’s friends) were paid only $10-$15 per month, roughly one-eighth of 
the government school teaching scale.
16  
  Programs to reduce the costs of schooling to parents can have dramatic and immediate impacts 
on children’s achievement and years of schooling completed.  Moreover, they can take advantage of 
existing underutilized capacity in the form of potential teachers and spaces in private schools at a 
fraction of the cost of building and staffing new schools.  Finally, they have the additional advantage 
that they use resources only if the children use the services. 
c: Conditional cash transfers 
                                                 
16 This should probably have been discussed as a supply-side intervention except that it is virtually indistinguishable from 
the capitation and voucher systems discussed elsewhere.  This system could have been designed as a voucher that would 
give households the resources to hire a tutor.   38
  Latin American countries have moved rapidly to the use of conditional cash transfers to induce 
parents to send their children to school.  These programs transfer income to a household in exchange 
for the household sending their children to school.  Many of these programs include other components, 
typically adding nutritional supplements and mandating health clinic visits for pre-school children and 
health training for mothers, so the programs are not aimed solely at education outcomes.  Programs 
have been or are being implemented in Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Turkey. 
  As with other demand-side interventions, these programs will be most effective in 
environments in which schooling demand is highly income and price elastic and where large numbers 
of children are not in school.  These circumstances typically prevail in poor communities.  Indeed, 
these programs are usually aimed at the lowest income strata of society, and considerable attention has 
been paid to identifying which households truly deserve the program.  Some of this effort seems 
misguided in that the poor often face transitory income streams that may make them appear poorer in 
some months and better off in others.  The transitory nature of income for the poor suggests that 
current income is a poor targeting mechanism.  In urban areas, it can be costly for authorities to try to 
establish which households qualify on the basis of income and which do not, and such efforts lead to 
moral hazard problems in which households may take on activities that lower their earned income but 
increase their chance of getting the government transfer.  There are significant advantages to using 
geographic targeting in populations where poverty is nearly universal in some areas, such as poor rural 
villages.  In urban areas, targeting on parental education may be less expensive and is likely to be a 
better proxy for permanent income than is current income.  In addition, parents cannot alter or conceal 
schooling as easily as they can alter or conceal their income, so the moral hazard problem and 
classification problems are less severe.   39
  Conditional transfer programs will be most successful when they are aimed at populations not 
currently in school.  In Brazil, where individual municipalities established their own programs until 
they were recently centralized under the federal Bolsa Familia program, some programs targeted 
children who were so young that the vast majority were already in school.  Allowing self-selection into 
the program allowed families whose children would have been in school anyway to opt into the 
program and receive the transfer.  Perhaps that is why the most careful evaluation of the Brazil 
program failed to show large benefits (Cardoso and Souza, 2006).  
  The Bangladesh Food for Education program transfers a grain ration instead of cash to poor 
households whose children regularly attend school.  In other respects, the program is similar to the 
Latin American programs discussed below.  Meng and Ryan (2007) found that beneficiaries stay in 
school around one year longer than comparable eligible children who did not receive the transfer, with 
a larger effect for girls.   
  The most efficient targeting mechanism would be to focus on the ages at which school dropout 
occurs.  In the least developed countries, the target age would be children of primary school age.  In 
middle income developing countries, it would be more appropriate to target secondary school aged 
children.  Illustrating this point is the finding that in more developed Mexico, conditional transfers had 
almost no impact on primary school enrollment (Schultz, 2004a) while in less developed Nicaragua, 
there were substantial increases in primary school enrollment (Maluccio, 2006). While most programs 
report positive impacts on enrollment, the gains are slight in some countries and substantial in others.  
For example, there was little impact in Honduras, where most of the targeted children were already in 
school and the transfer was considered too small to effectively move children away from child labor to 
schooling (Glewwe and Olinto, 2004).  On the other hand, enrollment rose by 23 percentage points in   40
Nicaragua during the initial pilot phase, with most of the gains in the form of children spending time in 
school exclusively, rather than combining school and work.   
  Summarizing across programs, it appears that the largest effects from conditional transfers have 
been in rural areas and in areas that were particularly poor.  The most efficient programs target 
transfers to groups that are not already in school so that households do not receive incentive payments 
for actions they would have undertaken even without the program.  
 
IX. Benefit-Cost Summary 
  Our primary task in this paper is to identify the low-hanging fruit for raising educational 
attainment in developing countries: What programs will raise education outcomes most per dollar 
spent?  We argue that demand-side policies dominate supply-side policies because it is much less 
expensive to stimulate schooling demand and because the costs are incurred only when households 
fulfill the program’s objectives.  If households do not send their children to school, the government 
does not expend resources.  
    Estimated benefit-cost ratios for discount rates of 3% and 6% are reported in Table 5. 
We report the estimates of other authors when we assess that they are more carefully done than 
anything we could do from reading the paper, although we make adjustments when the authors used 
other discount rates. 
  These estimates must be taken with a considerable grain of salt.  First, while there are reliable 
data on the costs of most of these programs, the benefits are based on the increase in projected lifetime 
earnings from the expected impact on years of schooling.  Our review of returns to literacy and to 
years of schooling demonstrated considerable consistency across countries, genders, and urban and 
rural markets in the estimated returns to schooling.  In the estimates we report, we assume that the   41
return to schooling is an increase of 8% per year of schooling completed over an estimated average 
earning for labor in the country.  Modest variation in the returns to schooling will not be sufficient to 
reverse the conclusions regarding whether the benefits of the interventions outweigh the costs.  On the 
other hand, we apply these expected returns to interventions that target young children who are not yet 
working, and so we do not have direct evidence of the impact of these interventions on their wages 
when they become adults. 
  Another reason why our calculations may be imprecise is that the returns to increased schooling 
will depend on labor market and schooling factors that will differ across countries.  Returns will 
depend on the degree of economic freedom in the country, that is on the ease with which human capital 
can move to its highest reward.   The magnitude of the schooling increase will depend on how 
successfully the program can be targeted to those populations that will respond most elastically to the 
intervention.   To maximize effectiveness, programs should focus on the grade level where dropouts 
are most prevalent: at the primary level in rural areas and in urban areas of the least developed 
countries, and at the secondary level for urban populations in middle income countries.  However, 
there is consistent evidence that the most productive interventions will be early in life because: i) the 
costs of interventions increase with the age of the child;  ii) very early health and schooling 
interventions have been shown to be more productive than interventions later in life; and iii) the 
earliest interventions have a longer lifetime left in which to recoup the benefits of the program.  
Generalizing across interventions, the most responsive populations to these interventions have been 
poor, rural and female; the very groups that are currently farthest removed from universal primary 
education.   
   Skeptics may argue that the children who increase their schooling through these demand-side 
initiatives will receive below average returns to that schooling, which will bias our benefits upwards.    42
The rationale for these arguments is that adding more educated workers will crowd the market and 
lower wages for all educated workers, and that these children will overcrowd existing schools and 
lower quality for all students.   
  Yet the first of these arguments seems unlikely to hold.  First, even if every dropout is induced 
to stay in school until grade 5, they will be a relatively small fraction of the literate workforce.  The 
outward shift in the supply of literate workers will be modest.  Second, in developing countries, returns 
to schooling have tended to be larger at the primary than at secondary levels of schooling, and so any 
adverse impact on returns will be starting from a higher base.  Third, dropouts are disproportionately 
from households facing liquidity constraints, which means the returns to schooling are being equated 
to a higher than market rate of interest.  Therefore, their current level of schooling is inefficiently low 
and the return to schooling artificially higher than the market rate.  Fourth, returns to schooling in both 
developed and developing countries have remained remarkably stable over time despite very large 
increases in the supply of educated labor, potentially because there are external productive benefits 
from increasing fractions of educated workers that raise the efficiency of production.
17  Finally, even if 
the argument that raising the literacy rate would lower the return to literacy, a policy prescription that 
we keep some predominantly poor children illiterate so that we can raise the returns to schooling for 
literate children fails on almost any ethical dimension.  
  The second argument, that the children who are devoting more time to school will be spending 
that time in bad schools or else will be raising pupil-teacher ratios, is a more credible concern.  If true, 
then perhaps increased time in school will not result in greater literacy.  For example, the results of 
cognitive tests for the Kenya de-worming experiment found that even though students spent more time 
in school, their performance on cognitive exams did not improve significantly, although follow-up 
surveys may yet find an impact.  The increased enrollments in Uganda and India were apparently only 
                                                 
17 See Kremer (1993) for an example of such a model and Acemoglu (2002) for a review of others.    43
modestly accommodated by increased school materials and so school quality may have suffered for all 
children.  Nevertheless, there is no consistent finding that students perform more poorly in larger 
classrooms, especially in the range of pupil-teacher ratios observed in developing countries.  
Furthermore, our strategy begins with the group of students who started school, and so any increase in 
pupil teacher ratios would occur because more students are staying in school and not because formerly 
absent students are now attending. Our view is that the tie between years of schooling and lifetime 
earnings is sufficiently strong that the benefits will yet become apparent as these children age, even if 
they do not appear immediately.  It should be emphasized that in most of the cases summarized in 
Table 5, improved cognitive ability did accompany the increased time in school when both were 
measured.  
  In designing these programs, efforts to supplement existing supply by working outside the 
government school system are generally less expensive and subject to fewer regulatory constraints.  
Such private sector educational programs will be most effective in urban areas where the elasticity of 
educational supply is greatest.  Health programs offer opportunities for collateral educational benefits 
while improving child welfare.   
  We should emphasize that where there are binding space constraints in school, stimulating 
demand will not be effective without a concomitant increase in supply.  However, programs that 
require an increase in supply are much more expensive than programs that exploit existing excess 
school capacity.  Secondly, programs that can make better use of existing resources such as those that 
reduce teacher absenteeism or enhance parental commitment to the school show promise but are still in 
preliminary testing.  More work is needed to see how these programs can be generalized.  Finally, we 
know teacher and school quality matter, but we do not know how to foster quality.  Until we do, we 
cannot make a proposal focusing on quality enhancements.    44
  In our estimates of the benefits of demand-side policy prescriptions, we assume a 45 year work 
career.  In our projection of lifetime earnings, we implicit assume that the value of time outside the 
market rises in value at the same rate as the value of time in the labor market.  This assumption is 
particularly suspect in the cases where women are not commonly found in the labor market, as in the 
Pakistan example.  On the other hand, we do not make any adjustments for possible external benefits 
of women’s education such as healthier children and reduced fertility which would create a bias in the 
other direction, and note further that the literature has not demonstrated that returns to girls’ schooling 
are substantially lower than are returns to boys’ schooling.  We also make no adjustments for any 
possible additional external benefits from better functioning labor markets, more efficient use of 
capital and technology, or better functioning government institutions.  Finally, we assume that the 
benefits of the intervention are confined to the individual child who was the target of the intervention.  
It is plausible that benefits may cross generations in that more educated parents can better provide for 
their children, but such projections are even more speculative than the labor market earnings 
projections that underlie our current projections, and those benefits are occurring sufficiently far into 
the future that they will be heavily discounted.  We expect that our more limited measure of the likely 
returns to schooling will counteract any upward bias in returns attributable to our ignoring any lower 
quality in the schools available to these children.  
We provide summary information on benefit-costs ratios for many of the programs mentioned 
above.  Our estimates concentrate narrowly on the returns from additional years schooling induced by 
the program.  This can be misleading in either direction.  The reported benefit cost ratios will be biased 
downward in that they ignore external benefits and benefits from health improvements.  These biases 
can be large.  Adding the impact that increased years of schooling reduces the fertility rates of young 
women, as was found in the Colombia PACES case, raised benefit cost ratios substantially, to 25.6,   45
instead of 3.3 when only the earnings benefits of schooling are included (Knowles and Behrman, 
2005).    
On the other hand, past returns to schooling may overstate the future earnings of previously 
marginalized children whose schooling is disproportionately rising as a result of these programs.  Such 
groups may well face more difficulty finding employment and entry into higher paying occupations 
than have groups who would finish schooling without public financial support.  
X. Why Benefit –Cost Ratios Vary  
  It is immediately clear that many of these benefit-cost ratios are large, and some are extremely 
so.  The largest tend to be very low cost health interventions in areas with a very clearly defined need, 
such as 92% worm infestation in Kenya.  Others are low cost provision of private teachers or tutors for 
underserved poor children in urban Pakistan and in India.  The very high benefit-cost ratios are 
attributable both to the selection of very low cost interventions and to the placement of these 
interventions in settings where they would be disproportionately successful.  The expansion of these 
programs more broadly would occur in less fruitful areas and at a higher costs, implying that the 
benefit cost ratios would fall.  The key point is that even very substantial corrections for selection 
would still suggest that these programs are worthwhile. 
The more broadly distributed interventions such as the conditional cash transfer programs or 
the voucher plans are less selective in terms of the places where the interventions are implemented and 
as a result the benefits are more modest.  In those cases, the largest benefits are found when they target 
populations that are initially out of school.  For the Mexican Progresa intervention, cash transfers to 
younger children were almost certainly not cost effective because most of the children were already in 
school.  The cost per increased year of schooling at the primary level was roughly six times the cost of 
inducing an additional year of schooling at the secondary level.   46
  Another generalization that is apparent in Table 5 is that the largest benefit-cost ratios are 
interventions early in the child’s life because the interventions cost less and the child’s opportunity 
costs are small.  Nevertheless, some programs targeted at older children can still be cost effective if the 
costs are modest.  The iron supplement aimed at secondary students had substantial benefits because 
the costs were so low.  The benefits were more modest from the Colombia PACES program because 
the voucher was more costly, although recall that the benefits are more substantial when the collateral 
benefit of reduced fertility is included.  Importantly, neither the iron supplement program nor the 
voucher program required building more schools or adding capacity, a key to keeping their costs low 
relative to their benefits. 
 
XI.  Conclusions 
  In examining the pattern of results in Table 5, it seems clear that the most cost effective 
interventions occur when children are dropping out for reasons of malnutrition or treatable illness.  
Often very low cost interventions offered at the school site correct the health problems, improve the 
cognitive capacity of the child, and increase attendance.  While this represents perhaps only 10% of the 
illiteracy problem according to the estimates in Table 3, it is by far the most cost effective solution.  
School dropout attributable to poverty or child labor is a more prevalent problem and requires more 
expensive interventions to correct.  Nevertheless, use of conditional cash transfers, capitation grants or 
school vouchers can sufficiently increase literacy rates so that the benefits outweigh the costs.    
Where possible, education and health interventions should be married as each will enforce the 
other.  It is cheaper to distribute health and nutrition services at the school site, and in so doing, parents 
are more likely to send their children to school.  When the mechanism used to increase school demand 
involves transfers that improve a child’s health and nutrition, we also improve the child’s cognitive   47
capabilities and school performance, raising the returns to the program.  Any additional external 
benefits from individual schooling just add to the plus side of the ledger.  These collateral benefits 
come at no added cost, lowering the risk and raising the expected return to the intervention. 
  To put our strategy in perspective, we estimate that every year, approximately 14.4 million 
children could be induced to attain literacy in a cost-effective manner because they start schooling but 
drop out before completing grade 5.  We take the fact that they start school as evidence that there is 
some source of school supply in close proximity to the home, and so it is the demand side that is 
constraining their completion of five years of schooling.  Several modest cost mechanisms have been 
tried to stimulate schooling demand for such children by lowering the cost of attending school or by 
tying the receipt of health services, nutritional supplements or income to child attendance at school.  
Although some programs had higher costs, $250 would pay for all but the most expensive of the 
interventions summarized in Table 5. That means that for $3.6 billion, and perhaps much less, we 
could significantly raise the schooling attainment of these 14.4 million children by one year.  To raise 
their attainment by the 2.5 years on average needed to complete the primary cycle, the cost would 
come to $9 billion.     48
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Table 1: Sample statistics of estimated returns per year of schooling in developing 
countries. 
 
Percentile Male    Female    Urban    Rural 
10  2.3  3.7  3.8  1.2 
25  4.5  8.9  6.3  5.4 
50 8.2  10.3    9.2  8 
75  9.5  12.3  10.6  10.1 
90  11.4  13.2  11.6  12.6 
Average  7.2  9.8  8.3  7.5 
Standard  Deviation 4.4  3.7  3.8  5 
Skewness -1.2  -1    -1.3 -0.9 
Correlation 0.85    0.85 
 
Authors' compilations of estimated returns to schooling using a standard Mincerian 
earnings functions applied to 63 household data sets from 42 developing countries.  
These are the same data sets used for Figure 1 except that some data sets are 
dropped because they did not have separate information on urban, rural, male, and 
female earnings.  We thank Claudio Montenegro for supplying these estimates.   
Table 2: Percent of youth 15-19 years old not completing grade 5 and of 14 year olds never starting school, by region  
 Africa  Asia  Eastern 
Europe 
Latin America  Middle East 
Sample East-South
a  West-Middle East-Pacific
e  South  China  Central Asia  Central  South  North Africa 
 [15]  [20]  [11]  [6]  [1]  [11]  [10]  [9]  [3] 
All children     
Not completing
b  40.9% 46.5%  12.6%  32.2%  1.3% 4.8%  17.5%  14.3%  19.1% 
Never starting
c  14.4% 24.6%  2.6%  17.1%  0.0% 3.5% 6.9%  0.8%  7.4% 
Drop out
d   26.5%  21.9%  10.0%  15.1%  1.3% 1.3%  10.6%  13.5%  11.7% 
Males                 
Not completing
b  39.9% 40.9%  13.1%  25.0%  1.0% 3.3%  18.1%  16.5%  15.2% 
Never starting
c  12.5% 20.7%  2.4%  11.1%  0.0% 1.6% 7.8%  0.9%  4.2% 
Drop out
d   27.4%  20.2%  10.7%  13.9%  1.0% 1.7%  10.3%  15.6%  11.0% 
Females                 
Not completing
b  41.9% 51.9%  11.9%  39.9%  1.8% 6.3%  16.8%  12.2%  22.9% 
Never starting
c  16.7% 28.5%  2.8%  23.5%  0.0% 5.0% 6.1%  0.7%  10.6% 
Drop out
d   25.2%  23.3%  9.2%  16.3%  1.8% 1.3%  10.7%  11.5%  12.3% 
Urban                 
Not completing
b  20.4% 29.0%  7.3%  18.5%  1.2% 4.0%  11.4%  10.6%  10.6% 
Never starting
c  5.0% 13.2%  1.6%  8.1%  0.0% 2.2% 4.4%  0.6%  3.2% 
Drop out
d   15.4%  15.7%  5.7%  10.4%  1.2% 1.9% 7.0%  10.0%  7.4% 
Rural                 
Not completing
b  46.6% 56.8%  15.1%  37.6%  1.4% 6.2%  23.9%  29.0%  27.9% 
Never starting
c  16.3% 30.6%  2.9%  20.6%  0.0% 5.4% 8.9%  1.7%  11.4% 
Drop out
d   30.3%  26.2%  12.1%  17.0%  1.4% 0.8%  15.0%  27.3%  16.5% 
Bottom two household income quintiles           
Not completing
b  55.0% 64.7%  24.0%  54.0%  1.8% 6.8%  44.6%  15.3%  35.2% 
Never starting
c  22.2% 36.8%  5.5% 27.8%  0.0% 5.7% 8.9%  1.7%  15.2% 
Drop out
d   32.9%  28.0%  18.5%  26.2%  1.8% 1.1%  35.8%  13.6%  20.0% 
Source: Authors compilation of data compiled by Deon Filmer from the most recently available household surveys conducted in each of 86 developing countries between 1994-2005.  
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/edattain/ 
a Population-share weighted averages of countries in the region. Number of countries included in the regional average is in brackets 
bThe share of 15-19 year-olds who did not complete grade 5       
cThe share of 14 year-olds who never attended school         
dEstimated share of 15-19 year-olds who started school but dropped out before completing grade 5 
e Excluding China   59
Table 3: Reasons for Not Attending School in Urban and Rural Populations, by World Region 
 
 
All World 
Regions 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
North Africa & 
Middle East 
Central Asia & 
Europe 
South & East 
Asia 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
  Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban  Rural Urban  Rural Urban Rural 
Work outside the home  7.4  4.2  3.3  1.8 0.7 0.7 9.3  7.8 8.7 4.4  18.3  10.0 
Housework  7.3  11.5  5.3 7.9 5.6 9.9 6.3  9.3  10.7  19.7 11.7 17.9 
Inadequate school supply  1.9  4.9  1.8  3.2 2.0 6.2 1.3  3.0 1.7  2.7 2.6  10.8 
Poverty  18.2 18.1 24.1 23.9  4.6  3.4 1.3  0.8  24.2  26.3 11.9 11.3 
Lack of interest  47.3  44.0  45.2  42.7  76.6 69.4 65.0  58.2 49.3  41.7 34.0 33.5 
Health  reasons  6.3 5.0 7.9 7.6 1.2 0.5 0.7  0.4 1.5  0.9 9.4 4.2 
Others  11.5 12.3 12.4 12.9  9.3  9.9 16.0  20.5 4.0  4.3 12.1  12.3 
     Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source-  Computations provided the author by Elizabeth King based on data from Demographic    60
 
Table 4: Percentage of developing countries charging primary school fees by region, 2005 
  Africa East 
Asia 
South 
Asia 
Eurasia Latin 
America 
Middle East 
North Africa 
Total  
Tuition fees  26% 25%  0%  20% 31%  40%  25% 
Textbooks  17% 41%  0%  20% 31%  10%  25% 
Uniforms  32% 41% 25% 10% 63%  20%  35% 
Parent Teacher 
Associations and 
Community Fees 
67% 91% 50% 90% 73%  60%  69% 
Other  35% 58% 37% 40% 36%  30%  36% 
           
Official fees   65% 75% 50% 90% 63%  80%  63% 
Unofficial fees  32% 58% 38% 30% 42%  40%  35% 
           
Any  Fee  82% 92% 63%  100%  79%  90%  84% 
Source: Author's compilation of data reported in Kattan (2006) Annex 3.  Original data taken from World bank surveys 
conducted in 2005 in 93 developing countries. 
 
 Table 5: Overview Table of Benefit-Cost ratios from various efforts to reduce illiteracy 
  Low Discount (3%)  High Discount (6%) 
 Benefit  Cost  BCR  Benefit  Cost  BCR 
Health and Nutrition Programs    
Bolivia PIDI: preschool and 
nutrition
a 
$5,107   $1,394  3.7    $2,832   $1,253   2.3 
Kenya: deworming
b 
2246! 3.5!  642    1448!  3.5!  414 
Kenya: preschool and nutrition
c 
2246! $29.13! 77  1448!  $28.6!  50.6 
Iron supplements to secondary 
schoolers
d 
$474! $10.49!  45.2   $289!   $10.29! 28.1 
             
Scholarship/Voucher Programs              
Pakistan urban girls' scholarship
e 
$3,924! 108! 36.3    $2,530! $118!  21.4 
Pakistan rural girls' scholarship
e  $3,139! $311! 10.1    $2,024!  $326!  6.2 
India balsakhis tutorial program
f  $7,002!   $9.85!  711    $4,515!   $9.76!  463 
Uganda free primary school 
program
 g  
3675! $140!  26.3   2370! $140!  16.9 
Colombia: PACES secondary 
school urban voucher
h 
$476   $193   2.5    $205   $190   1.1 
              
Conditional Cash Transfers              
Mexico Progressa
i  $17,565! $2585!  6.8    $12,923!  $2535!  5.1 
Nicaragua: RED
j  $5,920!  $1574!      3.8     $3,818!   $1574!      2.4  
             
aBehrman, Cheng and Todd(2004)# 
bMiguel and Kremer (2004)* 
cVermeersch and Kremer (2005)* 
dKnowles and Behrman(2005) 
eAlderman, Kim and Orazem (2003). Cost does not include value of in kind donation of building 
fBanerjee, Cole, Duflo and Linden (2007) 
g Deininger (2003)** 
h Angrist et al (2006). Estimate does not include the value of reduced fertility behavior 
i Schultz(2004a) 
jMaluccio (2006) 
#Benefit cost ratio computed in the cited paper with slight adjustments for differences in discount rate 
*Cost per year of schooling reported in M.I.T. Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. (2005) 
!Per year of schooling induced   
**Assumes that the government expands school space to accommodate additional students at the average  
cost per primary student Figure 1: Returns to schooling by high and low values of the 
Heritage Economic Freedom Index 
46 developing countries, various years between 1990-2004
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Source: Authors’ compilation of 69 earnings regressions compiled by Claudio Montenegro using 
household data from 46 countries.  Note that the data used for Table 1 are a subset of these data sets.   63
  
Figure 2: Distribution of self-reported literacy by grade attainment for youth aged 15-24,  
various countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors compilation of summary data from 73 household surveys spanning 57   
developing countries provided by Claudio Montenegro of the World Bank 
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Figure 3A: Proportion of Male and Female Urban Population Completing 
Grades 1, 5 and 9 in 72 Developing Countries
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Figure 3B: Proportion of Male and Female Rural Population Completing 
Grades 1, 5 and 9 in 72 Developing Countries
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Figure 4A: Proportion of Male Urban and Rural Population Completing 
Grades 1, 5 and 9 in 72 Developing Countries
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Figure 4B: Proportion of Female Urban and Rural Population Completing 
Grades 1, 5 and 9 in 72 Developing Countries
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Source: Authors’ compilation of educational attainment data compiled by Deon Filmer from 72 original 
household surveys collected from 2000-2006.  http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/edattain/   